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Summary of recommendations 
Recommendation 1: The regulatory review process should begin with the participation of all 
stakeholders, from industry (not just the applicant’s industry), civil society and government and seek 
a consensus endorsement in the scope and nature of the risk assessment. The stakeholder engagement 
should not begin with an evaluation of the outcome of a risk assessment. 
Recommendation 2: A scientific risk assessment should be based on scientific information that is 
available for review and verifiable (through independent testing) by qualified scientists who have 
reliable career independence from the commercial incentives pervading both public and private 
research. 
Recommendation 3: The regulatory review process should follow that outlined in the Flowchart to 
the Roadmap for risk assessment for the CPB, with particular emphasis on articulating and 
addressing uncertainty in the assessment and on an integrated approach that builds confidence in the 
assessment as it progresses.  
Recommendation Four: The regulator should reduce uncertainty in the industry about the standards 
required in the risk assessment process. The most straightforward approach is to establish the 
minimum expectation that the developer will conduct the risk assessment by addressing each step of 
the procedures in relevant international guidance documents. In establishing this standard, the 
regulator should expect a response to every paragraph of the CAC guidelines (and any other chosen 
risk assessment procedures) rather than picking and choosing post hoc which CAC recommendations 
to pursue.  
Recommendation Five: The regulator should review and address all data relevant to the outcome of 
the risk assessment, regardless of whether the data was obtained for the purpose of the risk 
assessment. 
Recommendation Six: Recommendations 1-5 should be completed before approving field trials or 
releases into the environment, or approval for use of the product as food. 
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Preamble 
In mid-2011 the Centre for Integrated Research in Biosafety (INBI) at the University of Canterbury 
received a request from Ms. Aruna Rodriguez to supply for her an analysis of the food safety 
evaluation conducted by the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC) based on the risk 
assessment conducted by the developers of Bt brinjal event EE1. This follows from previous reviews 
done by INBI and provided to Ms. Rodriguez and to the then Minister for the Environment and 
Forestry, Jairam Ramesh. 
This report is provided in partial fulfillment of INBI’s public-good service mission. The Centre 
regularly responds to questions received from representatives of civil society. This report is produced 
on behalf of INBI and is the author’s expert opinion. 
Concurrent with the production of this report, the Minister for the Environment and Forestry held a 
meeting with Ms. Rodriguez. That meeting established Terms of Reference for a Supreme Court 
Expert Committee. Much of this document will also form a submission to that Committee. 
Introduction 
Consideration for approval for the release and use of genetically modified brinjal products, herein 
called ‘Bt brinjal’, was conducted through a multi-stage process in India under the apex regulator 
called the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC). GEAC engaged two expert review 
committees (EC I and EC II) that were tasked with reviewing the primary data in biosafety studies 
conducted and supplied by the product’s developers and making a recommendation to GEAC. In 
August 2007, EC I largely accepted the developers’ assertion of safety based on their data of Bt 
brinjal, but made some additional recommendations to be satisfied before commercial approval could 
be granted.  
Between September 2008 and February 2009, the Bt brinjal developers’ biosafety dossier was 
examined and contested by international scientists. The petitioner Aruna Rodriguez challenged 
GEAC in the Supreme Court on the basis of these appraisals of the developers’ dossier. EC II was 
convened in February 2009 to answer criticisms, from international and Indian scientists, of the 
conclusions of safety based on the applicants’ dossier, as well as concerns expressed from civil 
society. GEAC accepted the recommendation of EC II, detailed in their report of October 2009, that 
Bt brinjal be approved for commercial cultivation. The GEAC steadfastly maintained that it had 
sufficient information to evaluate the safety of Bt brinjal for both human health and environmental 
release, and that the information provided to the regulator justified GEAC’s high confidence that the 
product was safe for consumption and environmental release. However, Mr. Jairam Ramesh, the then 
Honourable Minister of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, following a nation-wide outcry, 
intervened and instituted a review over the next 4 months.  
On 9 February 2010, as a result of the review including public hearings, Minister Ramesh announced 
a moratorium on the release of Bt brinjal. In coming to this decision, the Minister rejected GEAC’s 
advice.  
After a careful consideration, the Minister concluded that: 
“it is my duty to adopt a cautious, precautionary principle-based approach and impose a 
moratorium on the release of Bt-brinjal, till such time independent scientific studies 
establish, to the satisfaction of both the public and professionals, the safety of the product 
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from the point of view of its long-term impact on human health and environment, including 
the rich genetic wealth existing in brinjal in our country.  
A moratorium implies rejection of this particular case of release for the time being; it does 
not, in any way, mean conditional acceptance. This should be clearly understood.” 
In the Minister’s announcement of the moratorium he specifically indicated that the procedures used 
by GEAC needed to meet higher standards1. 
 
Box 1: What is Biotechnology vs. Genetic Engineering? 
From the Convention on Biodiversity (Biotechnology) and the Cartagena Protocol (Modern 
Biotechnology): “The term ‘biotechnology’ refers to any technological application that uses 
biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes 
for a specific use. Biotechnology, in the form of traditional fermentation techniques, has been used 
for decades to make bread, cheese or beer. It has also been the basis of traditional animal and plant 
breeding techniques, such as hybridization and the selection of plants and animals with specific 
characteristics to create, for example, crops which produce higher yields of grain… 
‘Modern biotechnology’ means the application of:  
a. In vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct 
injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or  
b. Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family,  
that overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not 
techniques used in traditional breeding and selection” (CBD, 2011). 
Genetic engineering (GE) is an example of modern biotechnology because it is based on in vitro 
nucleic acid techniques. GMOs are products of modern biotechnology. In this report, biotechnology 
is not synonymous with genetic engineering, but is reserved to recognise and value all knowledge 
contributions to animal husbandry, crop and forest cultivation, and fisheries management. 
 
This report specifically addresses the first and second Terms of Reference for the Expert Committee 
constituted by the Supreme Court of India to advise it on the matter of open field trials: 
1. To review and recommend the nature of and sequencing of risk assessment (environment and 
health safety) studies that need to be done for all GM crops before they are released into the 
environment.  
2. To recommend the sequencing of these tests in order to specify the point at which Open Field 
Trials can be permitted. 
I hope to constructively contribute to efforts to achieve a risk assessment framework in India based 
on international guidelines to establish the safe use of products of modern biotechnology (Box 1) as 
food, feed and for release into the environment. This framework, I argue, will require India to set 
                                                
1 For example, paragraph 16 “It does appear that the current standards by which the GEAC has formulated the 
decision to approve Bt-brinjal do not match these global regulatory norms to which India is a party.” 
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high but appropriate scientific standards for the data provided in support of the safety of this and 
other GM plants, and to require the same from other countries that export food or living modified 
organisms (LMOs) to India. 
Only when the regulatory procedures and framework are fully transparent and studiously followed 
will India create an “enabling environment” (p. 1 CBD, 2003) for the products of modern 
biotechnology, because the advancement of the use of new technologies will proceed even under a 
rigorous regulatory assessment provided that the industry has appropriate foreknowledge of the 
regulators’ expectations, and that all developers experience consistency in the regulation (Box 2). 
Guidance on the risk assessment and risk mitigation process has been published by numerous 
international bodies, government agencies and academic scholars. This report will draw on them as 
appropriate. However, the key recommendations of this report will be consistent with the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC), which issues international guidance on food safety, and the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB), which issues international guidance on environmental risk 
assessment. 
According to the CAC: 
“The goal of each safety assessment is to provide assurance, in the light of the best available 
scientific knowledge, that the food does not cause harm when prepared, used and/or eaten according 
to its intended use. The expected endpoint of such an assessment will be a conclusion regarding 
whether the new food is as safe as the conventional counterpart taking into account dietary impact of 
any changes in nutritional content or value. In essence, therefore, the outcome of the safety 
assessment process is to define the product under consideration in such a way as to enable risk 
managers to determine whether any measures are needed and if so to make well-informed and 
appropriate decisions” (paragraph 21 CAC, 2003a). 
According to the Guidance developed and accepted by the Parties to the CPB: 
“There are some overarching issues to consider in the design/planning phase of the risk assessment 
process to ensure the quality and relevance of the information used. These entail, among others:  
• Setting criteria for relevancy in the context of a risk assessment – e.g., data may be 
considered relevant if they can affect the outcome of the risk assessment.  
• Establishment of scientifically robust criteria for the inclusion of scientific information” 
(AHTEG, 2010). 
 
Box 2. Regulation per se does not inhibit the flow of benefits to the poor. 
This Committee may hear from others that the cost of regulation inhibits the flow of benefits of the 
products of modern biotechnology to the farmer and to the poor in two ways: 1) the regulatory 
burden slows development and limits the number of technologists willing to work in the area; and 2) 
the safety standards are set so high as to preclude solutions coming from the public sector, leaving 
the products of modern biotechnology exclusively in the hands of the large agrochemical 
multinational corporations (e.g., Focus E of WorldBank, 2007). These arguments have been reviewed 
elsewhere and found wanting for both evidence-based objective evaluation and validity (IAASTD, 
2009). 
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Notably, the public sector develops these products shackled to licenses and material transfer 
agreements from private and public actors (Heinemann, 2009). In the case of Bt brinjal, this likely 
includes for example foundational licenses between the public sector institutions in India and 
Monsanto Corporation headquartered in the United States. Whether recognised or not in developing 
countries, legacy material transfer agreements and use of processes or products that are recognised by 
prevailing intellectual property instruments, can be enforced once a country creates domestic 
legislation consistent with membership in the World Trade Organisation (Cohen et al., 1998, 
Heinemann, 2007, Heinemann, 2009). 
The World Bank was explicit in its findings on this issue: 
“With an increasing share of genetic tools and technologies covered by intellectual property 
protection and largely controlled by a small group of multinational companies, the transaction cost of 
obtaining material transfer agreements and licenses can slow public research on and release of 
transgenics” (p. 178 WorldBank, 2007). 
The World Health Organisation drew similar conclusions, saying: 
“[T]he proliferation of broad patents is thought to impede the research capabilities of other interested 
parties…The prevailing patent rules have the potential to limit the accessibility of these technologies 
to public institutions and ultimately poor farmers… This is because if and when researchers in public 
institutions do get permission to develop the technologies further, access is granted under licence 
agreements with restrictions on commercializing innovations.” (p. 42 WHO, 2005). 
Research-based assessments indicate that “[i]ndustrialized countries hold 97% of patents worldwide, 
and more than 80% of patents granted in developing countries belong to individuals or corporations 
based in industrialized countries…even pragmatic analysts from the North are concerned that future 
innovations will be limited under an emerging industry structure where the top five biotechnology 
firms control more than 95% of gene transfer patents” (p. 3 Sagar et al., 2000). 
While safety regulations may be perceived as barriers to the development and release of safe 
technologies, even if all regulation were removed the prevailing international intellectual property 
frameworks uniquely applied to products of modern biotechnology (and not breeding in most 
countries), would be sufficient to restrict development and to price out poor farmers (Heinemann, 
2009). “When technology fees for genetically modified (GM) crops are added on, the risk of 
purchase can often be considered too high for a poor farmer who is also burdened with excessive 
fertilizer prices and unpredictable rainfall” (p. 15740 Delmer, 2005). Even in the case of “Golden 
Rice”, extensive negotiations from an estimated 32 different patent holders were required to produce 
the final “humanitarian license” needed for the use of the product in countries with vitamin A 
deficiencies, and the license would have ongoing implications for any adopting countries should their 
export rice become contaminated with Golden Rice (Heinemann, in press). 
 
This advice is seemingly vague but for important reasons. It remains the responsibility of the 
regulator and decision-maker to make the final determination that the data were relevant and their 
creation was thoroughly scientific. However, a regulator acting without due regard in setting these 
criteria may experience a backlash. The top-down assertion of regulatory authority will serve to 
silence many on many issues, but when this top-down approach fails it does so catastrophically, as 
India has witnessed with Bt brinjal. Therefore civil society leaders and independent scientists should 
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be resourced participants, financially or in other necessary ways. This is essential to support ongoing 
dialogues that result in first setting appropriate criteria, then reviewing their operational success, 
resulting in an enabling and participatory environment for safety regulation. Importantly, in the 
interest of a sustainable regulatory environment, the practice of some governments that mix trade and 
industry development goals within the overall goals and responsibility of the regulator should be 
avoided (Lotter, 2009, Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002). The industry, even in poor countries, 
can fund its participation in these processes with far greater continuity than can the public, and 
through continuity of contact and other means can build a relationship with the regulator and its 
officials at many levels (Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002). It is a fallacy to believe that any 
resourcing of civil society will be in “balance” with the industry or those with commercial vested 
interests. Therefore, in order to set criteria, the process itself should be free of financial or other 
conflicts of interest, with those who have a vested interest in products invited only to put forth 
comment on criteria as they are proposed by groups engaged in dialogue with the regulator 
(Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002). 
In the meantime, I have considered the quality of the evidence submitted by the developer of Bt 
brinjal, the quality and currency of the scientific evidence considered by the GEAC, and additional 
scientific knowledge that is pertinent and/or used by GMO regulatory authorities around the world to 
put forth comment on what I believe could be considered as a framework for future proposals to use 
GM crops as food, feed or for release into the environment in India. Those who take the ultimate 
decision to approve, approve with conditions, or to reject a product of modern biotechnology will 
draw upon their superior knowledge of India’s culture and environment. As with guidance issued by 
international expert bodies, this guidance is intended to be inspirational. That is, the guidance is 
meant to assist the regulator and decision maker in identifying the issues of relevance for India. 
Bt brinjal  -  a case study for the Terms of Reference 
Bt brinjal is a shorthand for a proprietary derivative of brinjal that has been genetically engineered to 
express an insecticide, in this case a protein that is toxic to certain kinds of pest insects. ‘Bt’ is used 
by some to indicate that the gene for the insecticidal protein is sourced (and subsequently modified) 
from bacteria found in the soil. These bacteria are Bacillus thuringiensis (‘Bt’), but the genes are 
from a large family of genes called cry, for the crystal forming proteins that they specify. There are 
many different cry genes and often several different variants can be sourced from a single clonal line 
of bacteria (Heinemann, 2009, Pigott et al., 2008, WHO, 1999). 
Origins of constituents of EE-1 
The specific proprietary claim behind Bt brinjal is for an event called EE-1. An event describes the 
type of recombinant DNA elements used to form one or more transgenes used, and the particular 
place or places that recombinant DNA has inserted into the brinjal genome. Event EE-1 was claimed 
to be composed of three transgenes (Mahyco, 2008, Monsanto, 1997): 
1. a cry1Ac-like gene derived in part from the DNA sequence called cry1Ac, the gene for the 
insecticidal protein (coupled with a version of the heterologous promoter called 35S from the 
cauliflower mosaic virus); 
2. nptII, neomycin phosphotransferase II, a gene that confers antibiotic resistance, sourced from 
a transposable element isolated from bacteria; and 
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3. aad, aminoglycoside adenylyltransferase, another gene for antibiotic resistance sourced from 
bacteria. 
The event was created using the techniques of modern biotechnology to genetically engineer a 
vector, or plasmid, originally isolated from the plant pathogen and soil bacterium called 
Agrobacterium tumefaciens (so named for its ability to transfer DNA to plants and induce tumour-
like cell proliferation). The plasmid was the 11.4 kilobase-pair (kbp) binary plasmid vector PV-
LEBK04, also called pMON10518 (Monsanto, 1997). Taken together, PV-LEBK04 has at least 10 
different DNA elements that have been taken from different species, including soybeans, viruses, 
plasmids isolated from different species of bacteria, and many of which have also been extensively 
and separately subject to in vitro modification after being taken from their natural sources (see Table 
2 of Monsanto, 1997).  
The commercial trait in Bt brinjal is conferred by the Cry1Ac-like derived protein. This protein is not 
Cry1Ac isolated from natural plasmids of B. thuringiensis v. kurstaki, but a protein made from a 
series of in vitro modifications. The first 40% of the amino acids found in Cry1Ac2 were replaced 
with 466 amino acids from Cry1Ab, another insecticidal protein. The developer has claimed that the 
fusion construct is 99.4% identical in amino acid order to the natural Cry1Ac protein (p. 33 of 
Mahyco, 2008). However, when I construct the fusion using sequences published in Genbank, I find 
that the fusion is a maximum of 94% identical to Cry1Ac (GenBank: ABD37053.1) and only 95% 
identical to Cry1Ab (GenBank: ABV91087.1). Based on these matches, it is also not clear why the 
developers have historically called their fusion construct after cry1Ac rather than after cry1Ab, or 
more precisely, cry1Ac-like to accurately identify it as a product of modern biotechnology formed as 
a chimera of multiple origins. Furthermore, the developer reports that a leucine residue at position 
766 has been replaced by a serine residue in planta. 
What appear to be small differences can be physiologically and immunogenically important. The 
change from leucine to serine at position 766 is of interest to the biosafety investigator because only 
the latter can be O-linked glycosylated by the addition of N-acetylgalactosamine through a side 
chain hydroxyl group (Mitra et al., 2006). “O-linked glycosylation has a profound effect on the 
antigenic properties of peptides. O-linked glycosylation can generate a neo-epitope (e.g., CII), or 
can have as an effect the hiding of an epitope (e.g., VF13N). O-linked glycosylation can mimic 
other epitopes (molecular mimicry of cytokeratins). It can change the properties of an epitope even 
without really being part of the epitope (CD43 and GPA)” (p. 178 Van den Steen et al., 1998).  
The implications of this are that the fundamental affinity-based tools used by developers to list and 
characterise all forms of the protein produced in the plant (e.g., western blots) may be compromised 
if they were not trained on the glycosylated forms that the plant may produce. All subsequent 
studies that are based on isolated proteins (e.g., digestibility, toxicity, and cooking studies) may then 
be invalid because they only have available to them a subset of the relevant protein isoforms that 
may be in the plant. 
At 99.4% identity, there would be approximately 7 amino acid differences between the chimera 
fusion and natural Cry1Ac (consistent with original description by Monsanto, 1997)3. At 94% 
                                                
2 Nomenclature: gene names are italicised, protein names Capitalised. 
3 EC II described the construct in Bt brinjal as composed of (the first) 466 amino acids from Cry1Ab and 712 
amino acids from Cry1Ac (amino acids 1178 to 467). The regulator said in EC II: “This difference of 0.6% is 
attributed to the difference in presence of one amino acid at position 766 i.e. serine in place of leucine.” 
However, as noted earlier, currently registered sequences for these proteins do not support that they were this 
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identity (consistent with current GenBank comparison), there could be up to 70 different amino 
acids. To conclude that a novel protein is likely to be of no safety concern because of even as few 
differences as 7 amino acids is not a research-based conclusion. Changes of single amino acids can 
significantly alter the characteristics of proteins (e.g., Doyle and Amasino, 2009, Hanzawa et al., 
2005, Zubieta et al., 2008), a fact that underpins the field of directed evolution (reviewed in Bloom 
and Arnold, 2009, Tracewell and Arnold, 2009). One of the characteristics that can be changed is 
immunogenicity. For example, several groups reported significant decreases of IgE binding to a 
major peanut allergen after mutating single nucleotides (King et al., 2005, Ramos et al., 2009). Even 
more surprising, in some cases even a synonymous (i.e., differences in the nucleotide sequence of a 
gene that do not alter the resulting amino acid sequence) coding change can alter the characteristics 
of a transcript or protein, or levels of expression (Parmley and Hurst, 2007). A single nucleotide 
polymorphism that results in a synonymous change can change the substrate specificity of the 
resulting protein, potentially by affecting its folding patterns during translation (Kimchi-Sarfaty et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, sequence identical proteins with differing tertiary structures can turn benign 
proteins into toxins (Bucciantini et al., 2002, Ellis and Pinheiro, 2002, Ross and Poirier, 2005) or 
agents that cause pathogenesis as demonstrated for the Prp proteins causing Creutzfeld-Jacob 
disease and mad cow disease (Caughey and Baron, 2006). 
It is common practice to further alter the coding sequence of recombinant DNA at the nucleotide 
level to replace synonymous codons or improve mRNA stability for optimal expression in plants 
(Beuning et al., 2001, de Maagd et al., 1999), and the developer indicates that sequence 
modifications were made to the cry1Ac-like gene (p. 33 of Mahyco, 2008). These altered sequences 
can result in changes at both the transcriptome and proteome levels because the nucleotide sequence 
per se governs interactions between RNA processing elements and the transcript (Parmley and 
Hurst, 2007). It is of interest to know how extensively the cry1Ac-derived fusion construct was 
modified at the DNA level and test for these kinds of effects. 
Characterising EE-1 
The developer claimed that there was a single insert into the brinjal genome and that it corresponded 
to just the cry1Ac-like gene DNA intended for insertion as determined by a Southern blot (p. 34 of 
Mahyco, 2008). There are several reasons why this evidence was incapable of demonstrating the 
required proof. 
 
1. The only probe used was described as “Bt” (p. 34), presumably meaning the cry1Ac-like 
DNA sequence. Since the probe is specific to only this part of pMON10518, the blot was 
completely inappropriate for establishing that there are no other inserts and no backbone 
DNA from pMON10518. 
 
2. No information was provided about sensitivity of the probe. In order to conclude that there 
were no other inserts of cry1Ac-like DNA, the developer would have to have had a control 
on the gel that showed detection with their probe at a concentration of 0.5 copies of target 
(cry1Ac-like gene) per diploid Bt genome. The developer could have identified a locus with 
more than one insert in tandem but miss single copy inserts elsewhere in the genome. This 
level of reporting is below what would be expected of a properly peer-reviewed scientific 
finding. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
similar. Moreover, a single amino acid difference in a sequence of 1178 amino acids would have been 0.1% 
rather than 0.6% as the scale of difference between the fusion and nature reported by the developer and 
accepted by EC II. Neither the original Monsanto dossier nor the EC II numbers support the EC II conclusion 
that the fusion had a single amino acid difference from what is found in nature. 
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3. The PCR data did not substitute for the required Southern data because small fragments 
could not be expected to insert in the correct order or proximity for amplification by this 
technique. 
 
4. The Southern blot image provided by the developer was below acceptable standard for other 
reasons as well. A light band of the same size could be seen in control lanes and in the lanes 
with DNA taken from transgenic plants. This result can arise from sloppy handling and 
loading of samples. It can also result from contamination of control lines. If the latter 
occurred, then the applicant would have inadvertently used controls that are also GM plants. 
International food safety guidelines specifically council against the use of GM plants as 
controls (CAC, 2003a). Since the probe sensitivity was not reported, the possibility that the 
control lines carried a single simple insert could not be ruled out with these data. In addition, 
larger bands were seen to hybridize and these could have inserts to which the probe binds. 
The only way to resolve these possibilities was to clone and sequence all visible bands. This 
was not done. 
 
5. Critically and most importantly, the developer used a plasmid that was designed to transfer in 
toto. The Monsanto Corporation, which provided the developer with the plasmid, states this 
plainly: “The cry1Ac and nptII genes were introduced into plants of commercial tomato 
variety UC82B using an Agrobacterium tumefaciens binary single border transformation 
vector, PV-LEBK04” (emphasis added to quote from p. 14 of 138 Monsanto, 1997). The 
developer of Bt brinjal, and the two ECs advising GEAC, repeatedly failed to appreciate the 
significance of the plasmid map itself which clearly showed only a single T-DNA border 
sequence, and ignored the reports from independent scientists who alerted EC II to this (see 
Appendix One of this report). This fact alone invalidates the developer’s claims that parts of 
the plasmid could not transfer (e.g., “The ori322 region is present on the plasmid 
pMON10518, but was not transferred and hence was not present in the genome of Bt brinjal” 
p. 34 Mahyco, 2008).  
In conclusion, there were significant anomalies in the reporting of the constructs and in the 
characterisation of event EE-1. In addition to the anomalies, it was apparent that critical and 
fundamental characterisation of the event was not completed, usually because of assumption-based 
reasoning (e.g., the plasmid does not transfer because the developer thought that it should not) that 
was often both faulty (e.g., the entire plasmid was designed to transfer) and also not confirmed by 
readily available science. When such fundamental misunderstandings of the basic tools of the 
procedure were demonstrated by the developer, seemingly went unchallenged by the regulator, it was 
very difficult to accept assurances that the other procedures in the evaluation of Bt brinjal could be 
trusted. The downstream impacts of poor initial characterisation include: 
• distrust of the detection method (which ECII claimed without evidence was specific to Bt 
brinjal at 0.01% (ECII, 2009)), because failure to properly confirm the number and structure 
of inserts undermines the design of the tools used to confirm transfer of the recombinant 
DNA through crosses; and 
• invalidation of conclusions surrounding unintended changes to the transcriptome or 
proteome based either on the expectation that there was a single insert of expected structure 
or the failure to analyse inserts for open reading frames because those inserts went 
undetected using only a single probe to cry1Ac.  
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‘To review and recommend the nature of and sequencing of risk 
assessment (environment and health safety) studies that need to be done 
for all GM crops before they are released into the environment’ 
Comparative risk assessment, which is the most common form for products of modern biotechnology 
that are both intended and expected to be nearly equivalent to their natural (conventional) 
counterparts, is under prevailing international agreements conducted on a case-by-case basis. What 
this means is that the GM product is feature by feature compared to a scientifically valid 
“comparator” that has the properties of being: 
• not a product of modern biotechnology (see footnote 1 to CAC, 2003b); 
• the near iso-genic parental variety (AHTEG, 2010, CAC, 2003a); 
and is conducted for each event regardless of the behaviour of similar events or products of modern 
biotechnology. 
It would be far beyond this report to indicate in detail every experiment that might be required for a 
decision-maker on a case-by-case basis to establish the acceptability of all possible GM crops 
intended for release into the environment or as food and feed. Therefore, again using the experience 
of Bt brinjal as a reference, this report will attempt to provide guidance to the Committee about when 
and why to invoke the recommendations of Codex Alimentarius and other risk assessment 
procedures. Because of my personal expertise, the emphasis from me will be on molecular 
characterisation although I will contribute to considerations of what should be applied at other levels 
of testing, such as toxicity, immunomodulation, and environmental testing. Whereas the particular 
technical details of each risk assessment may vary from case to case for good and obvious reasons, 
there are some aspects of the assessment that are generic, have historically been undervalued. No 
amount of technical sophistication or asserting of authority later will compensate for a failure to 
properly recognise and respect these overarching issues: 
1. Risk assessment itself requires agreement on the nature and scope of the risks to be 
considered and thus risk assessment authorities must be inclusive, engaging all stakeholders 
in the formulation of the nature and scope of the assessment. 
2. For the component of the risk assessment that is based on technical (scientific) information, 
that information needs to be trusted. For trust, the following should be considered a 
minimum: 
• “Data should be of an acceptable scientific quality. Data quality should be consistent 
with the accepted practices of scientific evidence-gathering and reporting and may 
include independent review of the methods and designs of studies. Data may be 
derived from a variety of sources, e.g., new experimental data as well as data from 
relevant peer reviewed scientific literature” (AHTEG, 2010).  
• The science should be sound. “Sound science is based on transparency, verifiability, 
and reproducibility (e.g., reporting of methods and data in sufficient detail, so that 
the resulting data and information could be confirmed independently), and on the 
accessibility of data (e.g., the availability of relevant, required data or information or, 
if requested and as appropriate, of sample material), taking into account the 
provisions of Article 21 of the Protocol on the confidentiality of information. The 
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provisions of sound science serve to ensure and verify that the risk assessment is 
carried out in a scientifically sound and transparent manner” (AHTEG, 2010).  
3. Uncertainty exists at all levels of a risk assessment, from conceptualising the nature and 
scope of the risk to the collection of data, and this uncertainty needs to be acknowledged and 
addressed through ongoing engagement with stakeholders, sound scientific risk mitigation 
and post-release monitoring even after a decision might be taken to use or release the product 
of modern biotechnology (AHTEG, 2010, Pavone et al., 2011). 
If these overarching issues cannot be satisfied for whatever reason, including the capacity of the 
country or the demands of the developer for proprietary reasons, it remains the prerogative of the 
decision-maker to issue a decision against approval for the developer’s intended use. 
Recommendation 1: The regulatory review process should begin with the participation of all 
stakeholders, from industry (not just the applicant’s industry), civil society and government and seek 
a consensus endorsement in the scope and nature of the risk assessment. The stakeholder engagement 
should not begin with an evaluation of the outcome of a risk assessment. 
Recommendation 2: A scientific risk assessment should be based on scientific information that is 
available for review and verifiable (through independent testing) by qualified scientists who have 
reliable career independence from the commercial incentives pervading both public and private 
research. 
Recommendation 3: The regulatory review process should follow that outlined in the Flowchart to 
the Roadmap for risk assessment for the CPB, with particular emphasis on articulating and 
addressing uncertainty in the assessment and on an integrated approach that builds confidence in the 
assessment as it progresses.  
Use of risk assessment resources 
Conflicting opinions on modern biotechnology products is neither unexpected nor uncommon. 
Therefore, it is essential for a precautionary regulator to be independent of conflicts, or perceived 
conflicts, of interest (Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002). In recommending Bt brinjal for open 
cultivation and use as food, GEAC appeared to have lost the confidence of the States of India and its 
Minister, along with attracting the criticism of many citizens, academics and some from the industry 
as well. Every regulator must make decisions with which some will disagree. However, in this case 
the actions of GEAC gave the appearance that the decision was one which the regulator could have 
come to through a failure of process rather than a difficult choice. Following recommendations 1-3, 
above, should help to avoid this outcome in the future. 
In addition, GEAC can call upon international food safety and environmental safety guidelines (e.g., 
the CAC, World Health Organisation/UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, CPB), the scientific 
and other relevant literature, the Roster of Experts (maintained by the Secretariat of the Convention 
for Biodiversity), a representative diversity of opinion among Indian academics and Non-
Governmental Organisations and, finally, farmers themselves. International food safety guidelines 
are well established, even if their application from country to country is inconsistent. In the case of 
environmental testing, the CPB also provides broad guidance. There exists a considerable literature 
for testing environmental impacts of GMOs (for a recent review, see BAT) and there are mechanisms 
for seeking additional help (e.g., through the Roster of Experts). 
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Annex III of the CPB advises that: 
“Risk assessment should be carried out in a scientifically sound and transparent manner, and 
can take into account expert advice of, and guidelines developed by, relevant international 
organizations.” 
The CPB does not limit the regulator, but empowers the regulator to institute true transparency and to 
require sound science. While the CPB does not specify that India should require a particular 
experiment to be done, having considered either the need for some kind of experiment or the quality 
of the data provided, the regulator would be fully within its rights to withhold a favourable 
judgement until that experiment was done, done to a proper standard, and properly presented to the 
regulator for review. For example, there were many relevant risks pointed out by both the 
independent scientific community and by members of the GEAC4. Under the Protocol, these could 
have been pursued by asking for more relevant data: 
“Where there is uncertainty regarding the level of risk, it may be addressed by requesting 
further information on the specific issues of concern or by implementing appropriate risk 
management strategies and/or monitoring the living modified organism in the receiving 
environment.” 
Critically, a regulator should be supported either by its own internal capacity to perform safety 
testing or by a specialist community of fundamental safety researchers with clear career pathways 
that allow them to work without the need for industry or political associations for reasons that have 
been made clear by the research community (Graff et al., 2003, Lotter, 2009, Millstone and van 
Zwanenberg, 2002, Shorett et al., 2003). This is presently not the case, and not just in India. 
Professional entanglement with industry, including but not limited to direct access to industry 
funding, has been identified as a powerful influence on the conclusions drawn on the safety of 
GMOs. 
“[A]rticles where a [conflict of interest] was identified show a tendency to produce outcomes 
favorable to the associated commercial interests. These results support the overall view that all 
affiliations should be clearly acknowledged in scientific publications on the risk analysis of 
GM food or feed products, as the existence of such conflicts of interest is somehow interfering 
with study outcomes” (p. 201 Diels et al., 2011). 
“Career considerations, long standing personal scientific viewpoints, or value-based opinions 
over the role of science in society and faith in technology as a useful tool for solving global 
problems, may influence author perceptions and study outcomes” (p. 202 Diels et al., 2011). 
Moreover, food safety regulators around the world depend on data submitted by the developer, with 
the inherent conflict of interest this implies (Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002). It is a system that 
needs to change and the problems with this system have become most visible over Bt brinjal in India. 
Proper ‘risk assessment’ for both food and environmental safety includes competent and rigorous 
hazard identification, followed by safety testing, risk assessment and then, if appropriate, risk 
management (AHTEG, 2010, BAT). The key to proper hazard identification is confidence in the 
approach for effectively testing any expected potentially adverse effects of the plant and, importantly, 
                                                
4  For example, Dr. MS Swaminathan called for tests to detect potential chronic effects of eating Bt brinjal, of 
the type used to establish the causes of cancer due to smoking cigarettes. Letter from MS Swaminathan to the 
Minister, dated 4 February 2010). 
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discovering any unintended or unanticipated adverse effects that might arise from the modification or 
the process of creating the GM plant. As stated in the CAC Principles (CAC, 2003b): 
“A safety assessment is characterized by an assessment of a whole food or a component 
thereof relative to the appropriate conventional counterpart:  
A) taking into account both intended and unintended effects;  
B) identifying new or altered hazards;  
C) identifying changes, relevant to human health, in key nutrients” (paragraph 11). 
“Safety assessment should include data and information to reduce the possibility that a food 
derived from a recombinant-DNA plant would have an unexpected, adverse effect on human 
health” (paragraph 14 of CAC, 2003a). 
Applying CAC guidelines to Bt brinjal 
The guidance provided by the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (UN FAO), and the CAC varies from specific recommendations for experimental 
procedures (e.g., number of contiguous amino acids matching between a novel protein and a known 
allergen, specific controls in a protein digestibility assay), to higher level indications of what kinds of 
tests might be useful. The guidance then leaves it to the regulator to indicate what of this information 
is required to issue a decision of acceptably low uncertainty about safety. How the regulator makes 
use of this guidance has a significant impact on the trust stakeholders place in the regulator’s process. 
I will illustrate, with the CAC guidelines, how a process intended to instil trust might be conducted 
(Table 1). 
It is important to note that the international guidelines produced by the CAC and by the Ad Hoc 
Technical Expert Group (AHTEG) on Risk Assessment and Risk Management of the CPB are 
already ‘compromise’ documents formulated using contributors from government agencies (even 
from governments that may not be parties to the relevant international agreements), United Nations 
agencies, the industry being regulated and observers. All contributors regardless of whom they 
represent in text negotiations may have potential conflicts of interest5 (Millstone and van 
Zwanenberg, 2002). The CAC also has historically been placed in a role of trade promotion 
(Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002). The guidance produced by these international bodies 
represent the minimum common denominator of safety advice that will protect a state from trade-
related challenges (Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2002). 
I raise this issue for two reasons. Firstly, I wish to highlight that the guidance is not extreme in its 
formulation. Indeed these documents had strong representation from the industry and governments 
that promote the modern biotechnology industries. Secondly, there is the danger of further diluting 
the effectiveness of the guidance by “picking and choosing” the standards applied at the national 
level, especially when at this level the regulator or its expert committees may also have the kinds of 
conflicts of interest discussed by Millstone and van Zwanenberg (2002).
                                                
5 For membership in the Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group, see UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/5/12. “At Codex 
meetings decisions are taken by national delegations, but those delegations have sometimes been headed by 
trade promotion officials rather than food safety officials and national delegations often include large numbers 
of representatives of the commercial sector, with direct interests in the decisions they take” (p. 595 of Millstone 
and van Zwanenberg 2002). 
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In the table that follows, the use or otherwise of the various CAC guidelines is illustrated for Bt brinjal. 
Table 1: Selected standards allowed by CAC guidelines. 
CAC guideline Evaluation using the Bt brinjal risk assessment as a case study 
paragraph 18 (and 22-26 and 34, not reproduced) 
The safety assessment of a food derived from a recombinant-DNA plant 
follows a stepwise process of addressing relevant factors that include:  
A) Description of the recombinant-DNA plant;  
B) Description of the host plant and its use as food;  
C) Description of the donor organism(s);  
D) Description of the genetic modification(s);  
E) Characterization of the genetic modification(s);  
F) Safety assessment:  
a) expressed substances (non-nucleic acid substances);  
b) compositional analyses of key components;  
c) evaluation of metabolites ;  
d) food processing;  
e) nutritional modification; and  
G) Other considerations.  
While some information on this was provided in the various expert 
evaluations of the Bt brinjal data, as discussed above, in important 
categories the information was technically flawed, derived from unverified 
assumption-based reasoning, or missing. The regulator would have been 
justified to apply higher standards of reporting. 
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paragraph 20 
Data should be obtained using sound scientific methods and analysed using 
appropriate statistical techniques. The sensitivity of all analytical methods 
should be documented. 
The reports should have described all experimental procedures as necessary 
for the experiment to be conducted independently. This was not done. 
Points to consider 
Failure to provide this information is not acting in a transparent way, prevents independent verification and reproducibility. 
paragraph 21 
The goal of each safety assessment is to provide assurance, in the light of 
the best available scientific knowledge, that the food does not cause harm 
when prepared, used and/or eaten according to its intended use. 
The regulator should have a process in place that will engage all relevant 
stakeholders to establish the nature and scope of testing that will be 
required. 
Then the regulator should guide the process to ensure ongoing engagement 
by the group and enlarge the group as appropriate during the course of the 
assessment. 
This early and continuous engagement was lacking in the Bt brinjal process. 
Points to consider 
Failure to agree on nature and scope of the assessment undermines confidence in the outcome, as demonstrated by Bt brinjal. 
paragraph 25 (and paragraphs 35, 38, 41-43 and 49 not reproduced) 
The history of use may include information on how the plant is typically 
cultivated, transported and stored, whether special processing is required to 
make the plant safe to eat, and the plant’s normal role in the diet (e.g., 
which part of the plant is used as a food source, whether its consumption is 
important in particular subgroups of the population, what important macro- 
or micro-nutrients it contributes to the diet). 
Demographically relevant information should be developed. This includes 
variance in exposure according to cultural diversity (e.g., medicinal use) 
and according to age and sex. The demographic analysis should inform 
testing for maximum exposure and for such analyses as digestibility, anti-
nutrients and immunomodulation. 
The Bt brinjal evaluation was based on contested generalisations about how 
brinjal was consumed in India, drew conclusions based on comparisons to 
other products and not the Bt brinjal itself, and had studies that did not 
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confirm the Cry protein content in the food. 
Points to consider 
1. Average exposures are not informative when it comes to food. Even within apparently homogenous societies, maximum exposures can be 
significantly underestimated. Importantly, the physiology of humans and animals (wildlife, ‘nontarget’ insects, etc.) can vary with age, the 
potential adverse effect such as allergenicity or toxicity may be age-specific. 
2. Testing that can be affected by variations in physiological state of exposed groups must be customised. Recall as well that this is consistent with 
the advice from the Roadmap prepared for Annex III of the CPB (“data may be considered relevant if they can affect the outcome of the risk 
assessment”). For example, novel proteins that are or may be expressed in the GMO are commonly subjected to an in vitro solution intended to 
mimic the human digestive system. The stability of the protein is taken as an indicator of the potential for the proteins to persist and thus as an 
indicator of the potential for the immune system to be exposed to the proteins or their degradation products (Fu, 2002)6. International guidelines 
for the conduct of the digestibility assay recommend that it be conducted using proteins in their edible forms in a solution of representative acidity 
levels and concentrations of digestive enzymes and that the assay include controls consisting of known protein allergens to gauge the relative 
stability of the novel proteins (FAO/WHO, 2001). Physiological variation in digestive proteins and stomach pH are common, with babies as rule 
having higher stomach pH than adults. Adults have higher stomach pH as they progress through a meal. Depending on the concentration of 
digestive proteins and pH, different proteins reveal different potential allergens (Morena, 2007). Thus, a properly conducted digestive study will 
be based on a previous analysis identifying maximum exposures by age, sex and ethnicity and the conditions of the digestive study will be 
constructed to provide relevant data for these groups. 
3. Testing should be relevant to kind of exposure. Allergen exposure occurs through ingestion, contact and inhalation. Digestibility and 
bioinformatic studies are not sufficient to exclude allergenicity from tall exposure routes (Spok et al., 2005). In the case of Cry proteins, inhalation 
is a potent route of sensitisation (Kroghsbo et al., 2008). 
In the case of Bt brinjal, GEAC accepted from the developer evidence from only single condition digestibility studies (pepsin at pH 1.2 and trypsin at pH 
                                                
6 Note that the digestibility assay cannot prove that a protein will not be an allergen because many confirmed allergens are highly unstable in the in vitro digestibility assay. 
However, stability through a proper assay is evidence that the protein may cause an adverse effect and further testing should be conducted to counter this suspicion. It “is 
widely accepted that a protein that is resistant to digestion would have an increased probability of stimulating allergic reactions; in vitro digestion assays provide an estimate 
of the relative integrity of a protein and thus the probability of eliciting the allergic reactions” (p. 107 of Fu 2002). Likewise, failure to find regions of amino acid sequence 
similarity between novel proteins and known allergens is not proof that the novel protein, when used in food, will not be an allergen. However, matches indicate that further 
testing is required to ensure a protein is not an allergen. 
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7.5), did not report digestive enzyme to protein ratios, and used a surrogate source for the protein instead of the protein isolated from Bt brinjal event EE-1 
in its edible form (ECII, 2009, Seralini, 2009). Furthermore, a digestion-resistant fragment was reported as very stable. This observation alone could 
justify additional testing. The bioinformatic analysis was conducted 14 years prior, reported to be against a 1994 database of known allergens conducted 
by Monsanto and contained in an unpublished internal report (p. 106 of Mahyco, 2008). Essentially the same limited analysis was used to assess the 
allergenicity potential of NptII (Mahyco, 2008). No tests of inhalation exposure were conducted on either protein. 
paragraph 27 (and 28-29, not reproduced) 
Sufficient information should be provided on the genetic modification to 
allow for the identification of all genetic material potentially delivered to 
the host plant and to provide the necessary information for the analysis of 
the data supporting the characterization of the DNA inserted in the plant. 
While some information on this was provided by the Bt brinjal developers, 
as discussed above, the information was technically flawed and/or derived 
from unverified assumption-based reasoning. 
paragraphs 30-32 
In order to provide clear understanding of the impact on the composition 
and safety of foods derived from recombinant-DNA plants, a 
comprehensive molecular and biochemical characterization of the genetic 
modification should be carried out.  
(31) Information should be provided on the DNA insertions into the plant 
genome; this should include:  
A) the characterization and description of the inserted genetic materials;  
B) the number of insertion sites;  
C) the organisation of the inserted genetic material at each insertion site 
including copy number and sequence data of the inserted material and of 
the surrounding region, sufficient to identify any substances expressed as a 
consequence of the inserted material, or, where more appropriate, other 
information such as analysis of transcripts or expression products to 
While some information on this was provided, as discussed above, the 
information was technically flawed and/or derived from unverified 
assumption-based reasoning. 
Information that could be requested is based on techniques that produce 
descriptions of novel changes to the transcriptome and proteome (for novel 
RNA or protein molecules, or novel concentrations of normal RNA or 
protein molecules) for purposes of hazard identification (Heinemann et al., 
2011). This is especially relevant as it has now been confirmed that small 
RNA molecules from food can transfer to the human circulatory system, 
and are capable of altering gene expression patterns in mammalian organs 
(Zhang et al., 2011). 
If changes unique to the GM plant are found, these unexpected or 
unintended changes can be further assessed if necessary. 
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identify any new substances that may be present in the food; and  
D) identification of any open reading frames within the inserted DNA or 
created by the insertions with contiguous plant genomic DNA including 
those that could result in fusion proteins. 
(32) Information should be provided on any expressed substances in the 
recombinant-DNA plant; this should include:  
A) the gene product(s) (e.g. a protein or an untranslated RNA);  
B) the gene product(s)’ function;  
C) the phenotypic description of the new trait(s);  
D) the level and site of expression in the plant of the expressed gene 
product(s), and the levels of its metabolites in the plant, particularly in the 
edible portions; and  
E) where possible, the amount of the target gene product(s) if the function 
of the expressed sequence(s)/gene(s) is to alter the accumulation of a 
specific endogenous mRNA or protein.  
Points to consider 
This type of information is often considered the most basic component of the molecular characterisation. It is critical to perform to high standard because 
failing to do so can compromise the effectiveness of later stages of the assessment in profound ways (Heinemann et al., 2011). In addition, the information 
is necessary to address the source of potential adverse effects that can arise from unintended changes, as discussed in paragraphs 15-17. 
(15) “Unintended effects can result from the random insertion of DNA sequences into the plant genome which may cause disruption or silencing of 
existing genes, activation of silent genes, or modifications in the expression of existing genes. Unintended effects may also result in the formation of new 
or changed patterns of metabolites. For example, the expression of enzymes at high levels may give rise to secondary biochemical effects or changes in 
the regulation of metabolic pathways and/or altered levels of metabolites. 
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(16) “Unintended effects due to genetic modification may be subdivided into two groups: those that are ‘predictable’ and those that are ‘unexpected’. 
Many unintended effects are largely predictable based on knowledge of the inserted trait and its metabolic connections or of the site of insertion. Due to 
the expanding information on plant genome and the increased specificity in terms of genetic materials introduced through recombinant-DNA techniques 
compared with other forms of plant breeding, it may become easier to predict unintended effects of a particular modification. Molecular biological and 
biochemical techniques can also be used to analyse potential changes at the level of gene transcription and message translation that could lead to 
unintended effects (emphasis added). 
(17) “The safety assessment of foods derived from recombinant-DNA plants involves methods to identify and detect such unintended effects and 
procedures to evaluate their biological relevance and potential impact on food safety. A variety of data and information are necessary to assess 
unintended effects because no individual test can detect all possible unintended effects or identify, with certainty, those relevant to human 
health…” (emphasis added). 
As indicated earlier in this report, there were a number of sources of potential unintended inserts and gene products in Bt brinjal. These included: 
• undetected inserts because of poor experimental procedure, and failure to verify often faulty assumptions about the gene transfer process; 
• undetected alternative mRNAs or non-coding RNAs that could have arisen from: undetected inserts or undetected new open reading frames; 
alternative splicing of both intended and unintended novel RNAs because of recoding of the various genes in EE-1; unintended entry of intended 
or unintended novel RNAs into double-stranded RNA processing pathways that could lead to unintended and unpredictable activation or silencing 
of other genes, including those that might lead to higher levels of anti-nutrients, toxins or allergens; 
• undetected and unintended proteins or isoforms of proteins that arise from: post-translational modifications of intended proteins (e.g., forms of the 
Cry1Ac-derived fusion protein glycosylated at the novel serine but present at low concentration); novel small or large proteins from unintended 
mRNAs and these same as unintended and unpredictable post-translationally modified isoforms; collectively these could contribute to new or 
higher levels of anti-nutrients, toxins or allergens. 
While anti-nutrients, toxins and allergens are of course important to consider when Bt brinjal is used as food, taken together these same hazards may 
impact on an environmental risk assessment where they might manifest as unintended adverse effects to wildlife, important insects or to exposed 
microbial communities. 
paragraph 33 There were significant methodological flaws in the information provided 
with relevance to paragraph 33. Using targeted techniques for the isolation 
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In addition, information should be provided:  
A) to demonstrate whether the arrangement of the genetic material used for 
insertion has been conserved or whether significant rearrangements have 
occurred upon integration;  
B) to demonstrate whether deliberate modifications made to the amino acid 
sequence of the expressed protein result in changes in its post-translational 
modification or affect sites critical for its structure or function;  
C) to demonstrate whether the intended effect of the modification has been 
achieved and that all expressed traits are expressed and inherited in a 
manner that is stable through several generations consistent with laws of 
inheritance. It may be necessary to examine the inheritance of the DNA 
insert itself or the expression of the corresponding RNA if the phenotypic 
characteristics cannot be measured directly;  
D) to demonstrate whether the newly expressed trait(s) are expressed as 
expected in the appropriate tissues in a manner and at levels that are 
consistent with the associated regulatory sequences driving the expression 
of the corresponding gene;  
E) to indicate whether there is any evidence to suggest that one or several 
genes in the host plant has been affected by the transformation process; and  
F) to confirm the identity and expression pattern of any new fusion 
proteins.  
of in-planta produced novel protein, the regulator could require the 
developer to measure concentration in a tissue and time of development 
study across multiple test sites and years. Molecular mass of all isoforms 
using mass spectrometry could be measured. 
Finally, the regulator could ask for toxicity, immunomodulation, 
allergenicity or adverse effects testing on wildlife, insects and microbes. 
paragraph 37 (and 38, not reproduced) 
[C]onventional toxicology studies may not be considered necessary where 
the substance or a closely related substance has, taking into account its 
function and exposure, been consumed safely in food. In other cases, the 
See “Points to consider”, below. 
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use of appropriate conventional toxicology or other studies on the new 
substance may be necessary.  
Points to consider 
The regulator may be tempted in cases of “Bt” or herbicide tolerance traits to underestimate the importance of toxicology testing because these are the 
most common traits in existing GM plants. As extensively documented in the literature, categorising genes such as the cry1Ac-like derivative as having 
been for some time safely consumed in food is assumption-based reasoning with faulty premises. 
Firstly, the use of Cry proteins in Bacillus-based insecticides does not routinely leave high residue levels on plants (WHO, 1999) unlike its expression 
directly in the plant. There is no historical evidence of mass exposure to these proteins through either food or inhalation in the general population, and 
certainly no evidence of exposures at concentrations that are common in GM plants (Heinemann, 2009). 
Secondly, existing commercial GM plants engineered with Cry proteins are intended for use as animal feed. Thus, the exposure to the in vitro modified 
Cry proteins is at present very low in the human diet, even in the United States. Even according to industry figures (James, 2011), significant acreage of 
GM plants has only been achieved in the last few of the nearly 15 years since first commercialisation. Exposure is ramping up, but any possible long-term 
effects likely would not yet be detected. This is in contrast to the intended use of Bt brinjal as food and the real possibility of high human exposures. 
Thirdly, there is no post-market health surveillance, so there is no reliable way adverse effects could be detected and subsequently inform regulators who 
in turn are not accumulating objective experience with the use of Cry proteins in human foods. 
Fourthly, there is no “control” population in which to compare to assist in detection of potential adverse effects of Cry proteins in human food. The types 
of plants that have been genetically engineered are suited to use in processed foods and these are rapidly transported around the world. Thus most humans 
on the planet are being exposed to very low but chronic doses of GM plants. 
Fifthly, there is accumulating evidence of potential adverse effects of GM plants producing Cry proteins, and there is documented peer-reviewed evidence 
that feeding trials that regulators have been relying upon were inappropriately designed to reduce uncertainty about the safety of using these crops as food 
(Carman, 2010, Gallagher, 2010, Heinemann, 2009, Mesnage et al., 2012, Séralini et al., 2007, Séralini et al., 2009, Seralini et al., 2011). 
Finally, there has been no published testing using cooked and processed ingredients made from Bt plants and prepared as humans and not farm animals 
would eat them. While the developer heated and cooked Bt brinjal, it only tested for presence of the Cry protein (using undisclosed reagents with 
unverified sensitivity and effectiveness), which is not the same as testing for adverse effects. 
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paragraph 39 (and paragraphs 40 and 46, not reproduced) 
Potential toxicity of non-protein substances that have not been safely 
consumed in food should be assessed on a case-by-case basis depending on 
the identity and biological function in the plant of the substance and dietary 
exposure. The type of studies to be performed may include studies on 
metabolism, toxicokinetics, sub-chronic toxicity, chronic toxicity/carcino-
genicity, reproduction and development toxicity according to the traditional 
toxicological approach.  
The diversity of transcripts arising from the intended insertion and any 
potential unintended insertions will be unique to each GM plant and will 
have no history of safe consumption by humans. These small molecules do 
transfer to humans through food (Zhang et al., 2011). Likewise, any 
unexpected secondary activities of the proteins expressed may create new or 
alter existing metabolites. 
Information that could be requested is based on techniques that produce 
descriptions of novel changes to the transcriptome, proteome (for novel 
RNA or protein molecules, or novel concentrations of normal RNA or 
protein molecules) and metabolome for purposes of hazard identification 
(Heinemann et al., 2011). 
 paragraph 44 
Analyses of concentrations of key components of the recombinant-DNA 
plant and, especially those typical of the food, should be compared with an 
equivalent analysis of a conventional counterpart grown and harvested 
under the same conditions. In some cases, a further comparison with the 
recombinant-DNA plant grown under its expected agronomic conditions 
may need to be considered (e.g. application of an herbicide). The statistical 
significance of any observed differences should be assessed in the context 
of the range of natural variations for that parameter to determine its 
biological significance. The comparator(s) used in this assessment should 
ideally be the near isogenic parental line. In practice, this may not be 
feasible at all times, in which case a line as close as possible should be 
chosen. The purpose of this comparison, in conjunction with an exposure 
assessment as necessary, is to establish that substances that are nutritionally 
important or that can affect the safety of the food have not been altered in a 
manner that would have an adverse impact on human health.  
The absence of a compositional analysis was initially overlooked but then 
required by EC II after the regulator was forced to re-evaluate its 
recommendation to the Minister. 
paragraph 47 (and paragraph 53, not reproduced) 
The potential effects of food processing, including home preparation, on 
foods derived from recombinant-DNA plants should also be considered. 
Feeding, compositional, toxicological and allergenicity studies using both 
whole food and food processed or prepared as humans would eat it should 
be provided by the developer. A limited analysis was provided for Bt 
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For example, alterations could occur in the heat stability of an endogenous 
toxicant or the bioavailability of an important nutrient after processing. 
Information should therefore be provided describing the processing 
conditions used in the production of a food ingredient from the plant. For 
example, in the case of vegetable oil, information should be provided on 
the extraction process and any subsequent refining steps.  
brinjal. 
If adverse effects are noted with the food in this form, then require further 
testing or reject on safety grounds. 
Points to consider 
As stated above, the developer only monitored for stability of the intended protein in cooked products, not for potential adverse effects of Bt brinjal as a 
result of any unintended and unpredicted effects. Moreover, the techniques and reagents used were not reported in sufficient detail to evaluate their 
effectiveness. 
Feeding studies should be conducted and designed for the purposes of detecting unintended acute or chronic toxicity, immunomodulatory activities, or 
multigenerational effects (Carman, 2010, Gallagher, 2010, Seralini, 2009, Séralini et al., 2009, Seralini et al., 2011, Velimirov et al., 2008). Wherever 
possible, the source of the food should be whole food derived from the GM plant (or product if not a plant) which was produced under expected 
commercial conditions (EFSA, 2008). That is, if the food is derived from a GM plant intended to be treated with a particular chemical herbicide, the 
feeding study should include material exposed to the herbicide. 
 Annex paragraph 17 
As scientific knowledge and technology evolves, other methods and tools 
may be considered in assessing the allergenicity potential of newly 
expressed proteins as part of the assessment strategy. These methods should 
be scientifically sound and may include targeted serum screening (i.e., the 
assessment of binding to IgE in sera of individuals with clinically validated 
allergic responses to broadly-related categories of foods); the development 
of international serum banks; use of animal models; and examination of 
newly expressed proteins for T-cell epitopes and structural motifs 
associated with allergens  
The developer reported comparisons between Cry1Ac only and those were 
conducted against databases available over 15 years ago. Should follow-up 
with updated databases and inhalation studies. 
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Points to consider 
According to the developer, the Bt brinjal was cooked on an open flame, deep fried or steamed for various amounts of time. Then an attempt was made to 
extract only the Cry1Ac-derived protein (and not other proteins of the event (i.e., Aad or NptII)) from cooked material. This assay fails to meet the spirit 
of the CAC recommendation in several ways: 
• no methods, reagents or limits of detection are reported for either the extraction or ELISA. The failure to report on reagents is particularly 
problematic because these reagents, if affinity based, might be compromised for the detection of heated Cry1Ac. 
• the cooked material was not used in feeding and allergenicity studies. This may be important to ensure that neither the intended nor unintended 
proteins, nor unintended metabolites arising from the modification or the process of creating Bt brinjal, were capable of reacting under normal 
cooking conditions to create anti-nutrients, toxins or immunomodulating compounds. Cooking and processing are associated with altering, even 
enhancing, the immunomodulating potential of some allergens. For example: 
“In contrast to these so-called pollen-related allergens, roasting has been reported to increase the allergenicity of raw peanuts. For example, 
protein extracts of thermally treated peanuts have been shown to bind IgE antibodies from patients’ sera at up to 90-fold higher levels than 
extracts obtained from the corresponding nontreated peanuts. In addition, inhibitory ELISA experiments revealed a significant increase in the IgE 
binding activity of the purified major allergens Ara h 1 and Ara h 2 after thermal treatment in the presence of carbohydrates” (p. 2290 Gruber et 
al., 2005). 
In this example, even the minor allergen Ara H 1/2 (peanut agglutinin) was converted into an IgE-binding product after incubation with sugar at 
elevated temperatures (Gruber et al., 2005). 
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The developers did conduct a risk assessment that included some elements commonly found in other 
risk assessments of GM crops (a notable exception being a compositional analysis that was later 
required by EC II). Most of this content was extremely similar, sometimes word for word identical, 
to the text composed earlier by the Monsanto Corporation in a older petition to the United States 
Department of Agriculture requesting deregulation of a tomato line genetically engineered to express 
the same Cry1Ac-like protein (Monsanto, 1997). The Monsanto application was written in 1997 and 
thus draws upon literature from the early 1990s, and usually much older. This perhaps helps to 
explain why many key references are so far out of date in the developer’s dossier on Bt brinjal, 
supplied to the GEAC in 2008. However, it does not excuse the developer or the regulator from 
having not updated their own knowledge as the scientific understanding of the tools being used. 
In general terms, the developer’s risk assessment was technically consistent with paragraphs 21, 23 
and 26 of the CAC guidelines (CAC, 2003a), as well as parts of other paragraphs. But a risk 
assessment is not a checklist of compliance, especially when compliance is enriched for largely 
descriptive elements of the assessment and “cherry picked” rather than representative of the full 
advice provided in the guidance. Instead, the risk assessment is a dynamic process that should upon 
completion build a scientific case that potential hazards, if present, would have been found. It should 
build confidence that safety of the product was by design. For example, paragraph 12 of the 
Principles says: 
“A pre-market safety assessment should be undertaken following a structured and integrated 
approach and be performed on a case-by-case basis. The data and information, based on sound 
science, obtained using appropriate methods and analysed using appropriate statistical techniques, 
should be of a quality and, as appropriate, of quantity that would withstand scientific peer review” 
(CAC, 2003b).  
And paragraph 20 of the Guidelines says: 
“The goal of each safety assessment is to provide assurance, in the light of the best available 
scientific knowledge, that the food does not cause harm when prepared, used and/or eaten 
according to its intended use (emphasis added to CAC, 2003a). 
Drawing upon text written over 10 years prior and which cited work for conclusions long since 
expired (see above) does not suggest that the risk assessment was conducted using the best available 
scientific knowledge. The quality of the data as reviewed previously by the independent scientific 
community - particularly the lack of methodological detail on everything from the genotype(s) of the 
comparators used, to the molecular reagents and their origins (Appendix One and Appendix Two of 
this report), to the design and then statistical analysis of the feeding studies (Carman, 2010, 
Gallagher, 2010, Seralini, 2009) and finally through to the environmental risk assessment (Andow, 
2010, Gurian-Sherman, 2010) - indicates that these studies could not pass review by scientific peers 
disinterested in the commercial case for Bt brinjal. 
Recommendation Four: The regulator should reduce uncertainty in the industry about the standards 
required in the risk assessment process. The most straightforward approach is to establish the 
minimum expectation that the developer will conduct the risk assessment by addressing each step of 
the procedures in relevant international guidance documents. In establishing this standard, the 
regulator should expect a response to every paragraph of the CAC guidelines (and any other chosen 
risk assessment procedures) rather than picking and choosing post hoc which CAC recommendations 
to pursue.  
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Recommendation Five: The regulator should review and address all data relevant to the outcome of 
the risk assessment, regardless of whether the data was obtained for the purpose of the risk 
assessment. 
In determining whether the best scientific information available has been used for the risk 
assessment, the regulator should note this advice from the CPB Roadmap: “data may be considered 
relevant if they can affect the outcome of the risk assessment” (AHTEG, 2010). Provided that the 
data meet the criteria of being transparent, verifiable and reproducible by independent scientists, then 
the key feature for emphasis is only relevance of the data to the risk assessment and not the various 
side-issues such as “industry validation” (Heinemann et al., 2011). 
‘To recommend the sequencing of these tests in order to specify the point 
at which open field trials can be permitted’ 
In general, Recommendations 1-5 normally would be completed before open field trials are 
recommended. The outcome of the tests and their evaluation must be that there is no indication of 
adverse effects, or of adverse effects that cannot be made acceptable through risk mitigation 
strategies.  
Recommendation Six: Recommendations 1-5 should be completed before approving field trials or 
releases into the environment, or approval for use of the product as food. 
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